

“For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?” “For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.” POWELL: “They’re inspecting the ammunition you have, yes.” Here’s the conversation as Powell presented it at the U.N. The bold sections were modified by Powell: … Make sure there is nothing there.” None of this was in the intercept. … Concerning the intercept about inspecting for the possibility of “forbidden ammo,” Powell took the interpretation further: “Clean out all of the areas. Powell had decided to add his personal interpretation of the intercepts to the rehearsed script, taking them substantially further and casting them in the most negative light. This appears in Bob Woodward’s book “Plan of Attack”: resolutions to evidence Iraq was violating them. However, when he translated what they were saying, he knowingly embellished it, turning it from evidence Iraq was complying with U.N. Powell played an intercept of a conversation between Iraqi army officers about the U.N. Note that the Mk 66 specifications are unclassified, and the Department is planning to share them with the. Mark 66 air-launched 70mm rocket - that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances. requirements for comparable rockets.” In fact, the most comparable U.S. Our key remaining concern is the claim that the tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that “far exceeds U.S. The second INR memo, written on February 3, 2003, told Powell this: They were later quietly released as appendices to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on WMD intelligence. Powell’s own intelligence staff, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepared two memos commenting on drafts of the presentation. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so. POWELL: I t strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. This is some of what Powell said about the infamous aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq, supposedly meant for their covert nuclear weapons program: WILKERSON: had walked into my office musing and he said words to the effect of, ‘I wonder how we’ll all feel if we put half a million troops in Iraq and march from one end of the country to the other and find nothing.’ Unambiguous Lies What about in private? According to Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, here’s what Powell was thinking at the time: Later, regarding whether Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program, he said: What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. POWELL: My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. Security Council, was Colin Powell certain what he was saying was accurate? He certainly was: Powell’s speech can be found on the State Department website here. As you’ll see, there’s quite a lot to say about it. While the corporate media has never taken a close look at this record, we can go through Powell’s presentation line by line to demonstrate the chasm between what he knew and what he told the world. Even so, what did reach the public record in other ways is extremely damning. Unfortunately, Congress never investigated Powell’s use of the intelligence he was given, so we don’t know many of the specifics. Bush, was much more than just horribly mistaken: He fabricated “evidence” and ignored repeated warnings that what he was saying was false.

Powell, who was secretary of state under President George W. Colin Powell delivered his presentation making the case for war with Iraq at the United Nations 15 years ago, on February 5, 2003.Īs much criticism as Powell received for this - he’s called it “painful” and something that will “always be a part of my record” - it hasn’t been close to what’s justified.
